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Abstract:  Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative 
construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether 
monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the value of the currency 
or, for example, as a morality play. In this paper I will suggest that the very political economy of 
central bank independence requires a departure from such a practice. I will argue that the 
communicative articulation of the monetary game is relevant to understand how independent central 
banks can achieve institutional efficiency, and why they face no tradeoff between institutional 
efficiency and democratic legitimacy. In particular, I will suggest that an institutionally efficient 
central bank cannot but act as an agent of communicative empowerment of the audiences that make 
up its local context of operation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past three decades independent central banks have emerged world-wide as the 
epitome of economic rationality. It is therefore not surprising if public discourse has 
commonly treated them in technical terms. Yet, technical discourse has not been the only 
mode of representation of money and central banking. In an extremely rare contribution on 
the language of monetary affairs Brigitte Scherbacher-Posé (1999) observes that war, life 
and death, health, birth and childhood, physics and technology, sea, sport, building, 
marriage, and “legions of religious metaphors” have provided alternative fields of 
representation to talk about money and central banking. The Harvard theologian Harvey 
Cox (1999: 19), for example, recently remarked that 
 
the lexicon of The Wall Street Journal and the business sections of Time and 
Newsweek … bear a striking resemblance to Genesis, the Epistle to the Romans, and 
Saint’s Augustine’s City of God. Behind descriptions of market reforms, monetary 
policy, and the convolutions of the Dow, I gradually made out pieces of a grand 
narrative about the inner meaning of human history, why things had gone wrong, and 
how to put them right. Theologians call these myths of origin, legends of the fall, and 
doctrines of sin and redemption. But here they are again, and in only thin disguise. 
 
The political analyst Edward Luttwak (1997: C1) developed Cox’s remark even further 
with reference to central banking: 
 
a new religion has risen in the world, all the more powerful for not being recognized 
as such. Let’s call it Central Bankism. It is the faith of the men who control the banks 
of the world’s leading economic powers. Like most religions, Central Bankism has 
both a supreme god – hard money – and a devil – inflation.’ 
 
And The Financial Times recently drew directly from a pop cultural saga that retains the 
structural features of religion for the purpose of an ironic rendition of monetary affairs: 
 
For a thousand generations, the Jedi knights have ensured peace and justice 
throughout the galaxy. But now the Jedi High Council is facing the Phantom Menace 
(cue Star Wars theme music). Meanwhile, in our own time and galaxy, the Bank of 
England’s monetary policy committee (MPC) has ensured the kingdom’s prosperity 
for a rather briefer period. … Nevertheless, the MPC, like the Jedi Council, is facing a   3
menace. But will it turn out to be a phantom one? … The problem for the MPC might 
be tougher than the one threatening the Jedi Council. A Jedi knows that, when he 
senses a disturbance in the living force, it is a sure sign of danger. … But the MPC 
has far less precise data to go on, ranging from official statistics to anecdotal 
evidence. Armed only with such unreliable information, it has to plot a course 




To the present political economists have been indifferent to the plurality of forms of 
representation of money and central banking in the public sphere. It has not mattered to 
them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the 
value of the currency or, for example, as a morality play. In this paper I will suggest that 
the very political economy of central bank independence requires a departure from such a 
practice. I will argue that the communicative articulation of the monetary game is relevant 
to understand how independent central banks can achieve institutional efficiency, and why 
they face no tradeoff between institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy. In 
particular, I will suggest that an institutionally efficient central bank cannot but act as an 
agent of communicative empowerment of the audiences that make up its local context of 
operation. 
I will start by introducing in section 2 Susanne Lohmann’s audience-cost theory of 
institutional commitment that provides an adequate framework to understand the link 
between institutional efficiency and communication. I will then work out in section 3 the 
communicative presuppositions of her theory. And then I will address in section 4 their 
implications for the tradeoff between institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy in 
independent central banking. In particular, I will argue that there is no tradeoff between 
democratic legitimacy and institutional efficiency, and that the former is necessary to 
achieve the latter. In section 5 I will address the frequent charge against independent central 
                                                 
1 The Financial Times (08-07-1999: 3).   4
banks according to which in the age of economic globalization they can afford to eschew 
democratic rationality as a result of the declining effectiveness of formal democratic checks 
upon economic agencies. And in section 5 I will conclude by pointing to some of the topics 
that lay ahead of a research program on communication in independent central banking. 
 
2. Lohmann’s audience-cost theory of institutional commitment: 
    The question of institutional efficiency in central banking 
 
Central bank designers have traditionally regarded central bank independence as an 
institutional solution to the inflationary bias resulting from two problems inherent in 
discretionary monetary policy: the time-consistency problem and political interference for 
electoral or partisan purposes into the monetary policy-making process. To solve such 
problems, designers have proposed a number of statutory rules that, among other things, 
regulate the appointment and dismissal of central bank officials, establish the length of their 
tenure, identify the incompatibility of their office with other offices, define the ultimate 
goal or goals of monetary policy, specify the policy targets, and lay out the punishments for 
the central bank officials in case of deviation from such targets.
2 By including such rules in 
the statute of the central bank, they have meant to make central bank independence more 
costly to reverse, thereby increasing the credibility of monetary delegation. 
At the same time, designers have observed that an independent central bank should 
still retain an incentive to accommodate the principal under extraordinary conditions, such 
as major economic shocks, wars, or humanitarian disasters, and to react to the surprises that 
may spring up as a result of the deeply uncertain environment within which the central 
bank operates. As Lohmann (1992) shows, accommodation in these cases can prevent the 
principal from permanently disrupting statutory independence. 
                                                 
2 For references see Eijffinger and De Haan (1996); and Cuckierman (1992).   5
In conclusion, designers of monetary institutions have strived to find an optimal 
solution to the tradeoff between credibility and flexibility, or in other words, they have 
aimed at generating institutionally efficient designs. 
While addressing the trade-off between credibility and flexibility in monetary 
delegation, the designers of monetary institutions have traditionally assumed that the 
central bank would face one single homogenous audience. Lohmann (2003) relaxes this 
assumption and shows that, only by looking at the collection of multiple audiences attached 
to a monetary institution, will it be possible to fully appreciate how a well-designed 
monetary institution solves the trade-off between credibility and flexibility. For Lohmann 
(2003: 100) designing monetary institutions is about selecting the appropriate menu of 
audiences that will effectively monitor the institution and punish the intrusions of policy-
makers into the workings of the institution. The audience cost – she remarks - will give 
credibility to the policy-maker’s commitment.
  
Lohmann observes that there are two relevant types of audiences that differ with 
respect to their capability of assessing whether institutional defections are grounded and 
therefore excusable. On the one hand, the mass electorate can inflict in case of institutional 
defection the harshest punishment upon the government by voting it out of office but it also 
has a very unsophisticated understanding of monetary policy and therefore a low capability 
of discriminating between excusable and inexcusable defections. Lohmann suggests that the 
simplicity (or non-state-contingence) of the trigger-punishment strategies available to the 
mass electorate does not only follow from the low level of information or attention of the 
electorate but also from the quasi-impossibility for millions of voters to coordinate their 
beliefs on a complex (highly state-contingent) trigger-punishment strategy. On the other 
hand, elite audiences such as trade unions, employer organizations, financial institutions,   6
and academic economists, have a sophisticated understanding of monetary policy, a high 
level of information and attention, and can therefore discriminate between excusable and 
inexcusable institutional defections. Yet, they cannot impose such a harsh punishment as the 
mass electorate can do. In conclusion, - Lohmann (2003: 104) observes – audiences differ in 
the kind of defections they can identify and care about; in their definition of justified 
defections and unjustified defections; in the probability that the punishment is executed “in 
equilibrium”; in the quality and severity of the punishments; and in the distribution of the 
punishment burden. 
An audience that was capable of playing perfectly state-contingent trigger-punishment 
strategies and of imposing the highest punishment for inexcusable institutional defection 
would produce a monetary institution that is credible and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate extraordinary situations. Such an ideal audience, however, does not exist but 
it can at least be approximated by a collection of audiences that may collectively create a 
complex menu of audience costs.  
According to Lohmann the Bundesbank relied upon such a collection of audiences. 
The German general public used to adjudicate public conflicts between the Bundesbank and 
the Federal government but did not monitor the processes of reform of the German central 
bank in 1955-57 and in 1992. Instead, the regional states took care of the latter issue as a 
result of their permanent concern with any debate impinging upon their own prerogatives 
vis à vis German federal institutions. Finally, neither the general public nor regional states 
monitored the monetary performance of the Bundesbank. Rather, Bundesbank watchers did. 
And although the Bundesbank often failed to meet its monetary targets, it could meet their 
understanding by explaining its deviations to them. In conclusion, - Lohmann (2003: 106) 
continues – “the institution speaks to informationally segmented audiences with the result   7
that some aspects of its operations are transparent to some audiences and opaque to others. 
Audience scrutiny generates credibility; but not everything the Bundesbank does is 
scrutinized by everybody all the time, which is what generates flexibility.” 
After acknowledging the function of effective audience monitoring upon central 
banking, Lohmann (2003: 107-108) concludes that there is ultimately no tradeoff between 
institutional efficiency and democracy: 
 
Institutionally thick democracy can enter a complex institutional commitment … 
where an institutionally thin tinpot dictatorship must resort to primitive commitment 
mechanisms (machine guns). Mature democracies have more, and more powerful, and 
more varied audiences. 
 
In other words, according to Lohmann democracy is a source of societal complexity and 
sheer complexity, in turn, is the source of institutional efficiency. While Lohmann’s theory 
is correct with respect to the effect of audience monitoring upon central bank efficiency, her 
conclusion on the relation between democracy and central bank efficiency is spurious. I will 
argue that institutional efficiency in independent central banking does not result from the 
complexity-inducing effects of democracy but rather from the communicative function of 
democracy. To understand why, it is necessary to take two steps beyond her argument. First, 
one needs to unpack the notion of effective monitoring and address its communicative 
preconditions. And then, one must account for the relation between democracy and such 
communicative preconditions, thereby explaining in what sense mature democracies 
produce more powerful audiences. 
 
3. Institutional efficiency and its communicative preconditions 
 
In order to recover the communicative preconditions to effective audience monitoring, it is 
useful to address Lohmann’s views on the debate on policy transparency. After outlining her 
theory, Lohmann suggests that the debate about secrecy and independence versus   8
transparency and accountability in the institutional design literature moves from mistaken 
premises. The question is not whether the monetary policy-making process should be fully 
secretive or fully transparent vis à vis a single homogenous audience but whether 
information is segmented in such a way to satisfy the collection of audiences attached to the 
central bank. In other words, some audiences will need more information while others will 
be content with less (Lohmann 2003: 106). 
While taking stance on the debate on policy transparency, Lohmann seems to have in 
mind an idea of policy transparency as openness to release of information. Yet, this is only 
one of the two possible interpretations of the notion of transparency and – I would argue – 
the alternative perspective is not only consistent with Lohmann’s audience cost theory of 
institutional commitment but it is also the only perspective within which Lohmann’s theory 
can fully realize its potential. 
In a lively exchange with Willem Buiter (1999), Otmar Issing (1999: 506) has 
suggested that the idea of policy transparency “extends beyond mere openness” and cannot 
be collapsed into the belief that more transparency is achieved by greater amounts of 
information. Issing’s reasoning is further developed in a systematic manner by Bernhard 
Winkler (2000).
3   Winkler (2000: 7) complains that the current literature on policy 
transparency has adopted a simple one-dimensional notion of transparency which boils it 
down to the mere idea of “availability of information,” and that addresses information as a 
homogenous good. In other words, the more of it, the better. To avoid this, Winkler (2000: 
9) calls for a departure from the standard presumptions of perfect rationality, limited 
uncertainty, homogeneous information, common knowledge and friction-less 
                                                 
3 Bernhard Winkler worked at the Economics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank and then 
moved to the European Central Bank. Otmar Issing was Chief Economist of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and then moved to the European Central Bank as Chief Economist and member of the 
Executive Council..   9
communication. Or, as he also puts it, for a shift in the political economy approach to 
monetary policy transparency from the early to the later Wittgenstein. Winkler (2000: 7) 
defines transparency as “the degree of genuine understanding of the monetary policy 
process and policy decisions by the public” and takes it to be predicated, among other 
things, upon the sharing among the communicating parties of a common language for 
encoding and decoding messages. Consequently, - Winkler (2000: 13) continues – 
 
the primary task for central bank communication policy would consist of making its 
view of the world commonly understood and to make information available in a form 
(or language) that is shared with the public and understood across different segments 
of the public. In order to minimize higher order uncertainty about how other agents 
interpret information this suggest that central banks should avoid using a language that 
is only understood by a subset of the (relevant) public or leaves doubts that it may not 
be understood in the same way. 
 
On this ground Winkler advocates the creation of a common basis of understanding 
between the central bank and its audiences of reference so that access by such audiences 
to the monetary policy-making process will produce genuine understanding. 
What are then the implications of Issing’s and Winkler’s take on policy transparency 
upon Lohmann’s view of the central bank audiences? Lohmann argues that a well-
designed monetary institution comes attached to a collection of audiences that may 
collectively create a complex menu of audience costs. To carry out their distinct 
monitoring tasks, such audiences need different amounts of information. Therefore, - 
Lohmann concludes - policy transparency has to do with adequate informational 
segmentation. Following Issing’s and Winkler’s argument, however, it is possible to argue 
that informational segmentation does not entail transparency segmentation. In particular, 
informational segmentation can coexist and must coexist with a full transparency of the 
communicative process at all segments. This is clear also from Lohmann’s discussion of 
the three audiences of the Bundesbank. According to Lohmann each of them intervenes in   10
different cases and for different reasons, and needs different information and in different 
amounts. Yet, the situation upon which each audience is required to intervene needs to be 
fully transparent otherwise the audience would not be able to fully carry out its 
monitoring task. In other words, the audience needs to see clear into, or understand, the 
situation. As a result, different audiences do not merely have different informational 
requirements but may also have different modes of understanding and may therefore 
require that different ‘languages’ be applied in the communicative exchanges between 
each of them and the central bank. In conclusion, policy transparency is about adequate 
informational segmentation at least as much it is about adequate ‘linguistic’ segmentation. 
This is particularly important as one sets out to reconsider Lohmann’s reading of the 
Bundesbank in the light of her audience cost theory. Lohmann points out that general 
public, regional states, and Bundesbank watchers need different amounts of information, 
are interested in different questions, intervene in different ways and punish with different 
degrees of harshness. In the light of Issing’s and Winkler’s view of policy transparency, it 
is now possible to appreciate that the three audiences considered by Lohmann use 
different languages of communication as well and different modes of understanding. 
Bundesbank watchers use economics. Regional states intervene in defense of their 
regional prerogatives against the federal government by using legal arguments. Where the 
Law & Economics tradition has not gained a dominant position within the legal 
profession, and where the network of economists and that of legal experts only marginally 
overlap, economics and legal doctrine constitute two separate discursive fields that 
articulate different types of rationalities and therefore different modes of understanding. 
Finally, while intervening to adjudicate conflicts between the Bundesbank and the federal 
government, the general public will have to use modes of understanding that will be only   11
tangentially based upon economics or legal doctrine. It is plausible to expect that the 
general public will use some ideological device to make sense of the battle between the 
central bank and the government. For example, the public may be keen on interpreting the 
monetary game as a morality play. 
By interjecting Lohmann with Issing and Winkler, it is therefore possible to 
conclude that a well-designed central bank that efficiently solves the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility is a ‘multi-lingual’ institution capable of practicing ‘linguistic’ 
discrimination across its multiple communicatively heterogeneous audiences. 
I would like to emphasize at this point the scope of this conclusion as it implicitly 
follows both from Lohmann’s audience cost theory and from Issing’s and Winkler’s 
interpretative approach to the question of transparency. Once accepted the need for the 
central bank to take into account the modes of understanding, and therefore the languages, 
of the central bank’s audiences, one can no longer assume a priori (or impose 
surreptitiously) the equivalence between the economist’s interpretation of the monetary 
game and that of the central bank audiences. Neither can one assume the equivalence 
between the functional expectations that economists have over the bank’s task and those 
of its audiences. In other words, one must be open to the surprising discovery that there 
may be audiences that interpret the monetary game in quite different terms than 
economists do; that constitute the game by using quite different languages; and that may 
derive from their different experience of the monetary game quite different functions they 
expect the central bank to fulfill – the central bank willing it or not. For example, 
audiences may understand the monetary game not as a game over the preservation of the 
values of their savings but rather as a morality play. Therefore, their functional 
expectations vis a vis the central bank will revolve around the fulfillment of the symbolic   12
functions that are implied by their understanding of the monetary game. These symbolic 
functions make up the invisible statute of the central bank upon which the institutional 
design literature has been totally silent. Audiences will monitor and judge central bank 
performance along the dimensions that are relevant to them; and will reward or sanction 
the central bank on the ground of the central bank fulfillment of the audiences’ functional 
expectations vis a vis the central bank. It is on this basis that audiences will decide 
whether to support central bank independence. 
That said, one must expect that, depending on the mode of understanding of the 
monetary game, different individuals will act as central bank watchers, institutional 
stakeholders, or lay public. For example, as the monetary game shifts away from the 
monetary arena and turns into a game over national identity, economists will no longer be 
the central bank watchers. Rather, historians, philosophers, sociologists, political 
scientists and even writers, poets, artists will be central bank watchers, depending on the 
specific societal context. Similarly, if the game over money turns into a game over public 
morality, the moral authorities – secular and religious – within the society in question will 
take up the role of central bank watchers. It is also important to emphasize that not all 
audiences of a central bank are activated at the same time. For example, the audiences just 
referred above enter the game only after the activation of symbolic linkages between the 
monetary arena and their arenas of reference. 
 
4. Communicative preconditions to institutional efficiency: 
    How democracy helps satisfy them 
 
In the previous section I have argued that Lohmann’s audience-cost theory of institutional 
commitment is based upon a much too thin notion of communicative heterogeneity that 
blinds the analyst vis a vis the communicative preconditions upon which her conclusions   13
are valid. I have suggested that, in order to recover such preconditions upon which effective 
audience monitoring depends, Lohmann’s theory requires the thicker notion of 
communicative heterogeneity that underpins Issing’s and Winkler’s conception of policy 
transparency. On such ground – I have continued – it is possible to understand why a well-
designed central bank that efficiently solves the trade-off between credibility and flexibility 
is a ‘multi-lingual’ institution capable of practicing ‘linguistic’ discrimination across its 
communicatively heterogeneous audiences. 
That said, I have promised to show that democracy matters to institutional efficiency 
in independent central banking because of its communicative function. The purpose of this 
section is to account for such function. 
There are two types of local knowledge that are relevant for the functioning of a 
society. The first type exclusively resides within the individual and according to Friedrich 
von Hayek (1937, 1945) can be efficiently brokered by the market. The second type, on the 
other hand, resides within groups. It is knowledge about a given system of intersubjectively 
shared meanings and about the modes to articulate and produce meanings within such a 
system. Like a language, the latter serves to articulate the former. For example, suppose 
that a community perceives the monetary game as a game over national identity while a 
different community sees it purely in terms of maintenance of the purchasing power of the 
national currency. Knowledge about the way agents within such communities articulate 
their perception of the monetary game is necessary to decipher the meaning of their actions 
with regard to monetary affairs. In other words, their local positional knowledge is not 
automatically revealed by their action. 
In a society many different ‘languages’ coexist next to each other and the language of 
the market is only one of them. If it were the only one, it would be possible to construct an   14
argument – as Hayek does – on the sufficiency of the market as an institutional framework 
capable of efficiently mobilizing local knowledge of the individual type. Societies, 
however, are ‘multi-linguistic’ environments and local knowledge of the individual type 
must travel across linguistic borders, which poses a much greater institutional challenge. 
To mobilize local knowledge across distinct ‘linguistic’ communities, some institution will 
have to make sure that local positional knowledge is exchangeable along the surfaces of 
contact between ‘linguistic’ communities. Or in other words, it must foster local 
coordination at the border of contiguous communities. When two communities meet, local 
coordination (and therefore local exchange) between them can be achieved by means of 
‘contact’ languages that emerge for the purpose of enabling the exchange. I will argue that 
a pluralistic democracy is a system that encourages the emergence of such contact 
languages, thereby facilitating the circulation of local positional knowledge across 
linguistic borders. Furthermore, pluralistic democracies carry out this function in an 
efficient manner. 
By virtue of the principle of representation, ‘linguistic’ communities within a 
democracy are turned into constituencies. Such constituencies expect that their 
representatives pursue their interests. To do so, however, such representatives must be able 
to understand such interests as articulated within the language of coordination used within 
their constituencies. It is in fact this ‘language’ that gives meaning to the interests that they 
need to represent. As a result, representatives do not merely compete for the satisfaction of 
the interests of their electorate. They compete – and must compete - among themselves in 
the process of identification of the ‘languages’ of coordination used by the various 
‘linguistic’ communities. Furthermore, to expand their constituencies, they compete in the 
production of ‘contact’ languages that enable trade among different communities. Finally,   15
competition creates an incentive to efficiently engage in such a process of language-
bridging and language-crafting. In this sense, democracy should be thought as an 
institutional framework that jointly with the market efficiently manages local knowledge in 
a multi-linguistic environment and across communicatively heterogeneous communities. 
On such ground it is possible to conclude that economic institutions benefit in two 
ways from the positive communicative externalities of democracy. First, they will be able to 
rely upon a whole repertoire of ‘contact’ codes that democracy contributes to produce. This 
will enhance the capability of economic institutions to gain access to their communicatively 
heterogeneous audiences and therefore to their understandings of the monetary game. As 
already said, this knowledge is necessary for economic institutions to be transparent to such 
audiences and therefore to enable such audiences to correctly perform their monitoring 
function, which is ultimately relevant for institutional efficiency. Second, through 
democracy economic institutions will be able to rely upon an institutional mechanism that 
efficiently brings about communicative contact between distinct ‘linguistic’ communities. 
Being the communicative function of democracy conducive to the long-term 
efficiency of economic institutions, economic institutions must be vigilant in all those 
situations in which such a function weakens and must be prepared to take active action to 
restore it when it does. This sets the background to respond to a frequent criticism against 
independent central banking. 
 
5. Institutional efficiency by communicative empowerment: How an 
    institutionally efficient central bank helps democracy help the bank 
 
In the previous section I have suggested that democracy is an institutional mechanism that 
efficiently brokers a special type of local knowledge, and that such knowledge matters for 
institutional efficiency in independent central banking. In other words, democracy is an   16
internal requirement for the efficiency of economic institutions. In this section I will use 
this conclusion to address a frequent criticism against central bank independence. 
In a global economy – critics observe - formal democratic checks upon independent 
economic agencies increasingly fail to bite and therefore economic agencies can 
increasingly afford to act as autarchic institutions that eschew democracy and take 
economic rationality as their only guiding principle. 
In the light of the previous sections it is possible to suggest that the critics’ conclusion 
is a no sequitur. The erosion of formal democratic institutions and the emergence of 
economic rationality as the exclusive guiding principle of independent economic agencies 
do not imply that independent economic agencies can afford to depart from democracy. On 
the very contrary, if such agencies pursue efficiency – as they should if they are self-
consistent about their commitment to economic rationality – they are bound to nest the 
communicative function of democracy into their own practices, which requires on their part 
acknowledging the communicative heterogeneity of their audiences and adjusting their 
internal organizational incentives to do so. 
By acknowledging the communicative heterogeneity of their audiences, independent 
central banks will engage in the very same language-bridging function that the democratic 
process performs on a routine basis. And by adjusting their internal organizational 
incentives so as to support the language-bridging effort, independent central banks will 
translate into the own practices the incentive for competitive representation that the 
democratic process generates. 
In conclusion, if the practice of independent central banking homogenizes the 
audiences, then local knowledge is destroyed, institutional efficiency is threatened, and 
democracy is tramped over. On the other hand, if the practice of independent central   17
banking self-consistently and systematically acknowledges communicative heterogeneity, 
then local knowledge is not dissipated, institutional efficiency is maintained, and 
democracy is reproduced by proxy. 
That said, I would like to return to Lohmann for one last comment. Lohmann (2000: 
107-108) suggests that “mature democracies have more, and more powerful, and more 
varied audiences.” Therefore, by creating the conditions for complex monitoring – she 
concludes – democracy is functional to institutional efficiency. In the light of the argument 
carried out in this paper one can argue that the possibility of complex monitoring does 
neither automatically follow from the variety or high number of audiences per se nor from 
their generic social power. After all, if this were the case, then the Soviet system would 
have produced the same effects that Lohmann attributes to democracy since it generated 
many audiences and many powerful ones, too. Instead, it is because democracy creates 
positive incentives for language-bridging and language-crafting across heterogeneous 
audiences, thereby communicatively empowering such audiences vis a vis the central bank, 
that audiences can fulfill their monitoring task. In other words, communicative 
empowerment is the ultimate reason why democratic legitimacy and institutional efficiency 
in independent central banking central are reconcilable and why independent central banks 
are bound to contribute to the strengthening of the democratic process if they are fully 
committed to institutional efficiency. 
 
6. A research program on communication in independent central 
    banking: The work ahead 
     
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction 
of money and central banking in the public sphere. It has not mattered to them whether 
monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the value of the   18
currency or, for example, as a morality play. In this paper I have suggested that the very 
political economy of central bank independence requires a departure from such a practice. I 
have argued that the communicative articulation of the monetary game is relevant to 
understand how independent central banks can achieve institutional efficiency, and why 
they face no tradeoff between institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy. In 
particular, I have suggested that an institutionally efficient central bank cannot but act as an 
agent of communicative empowerment of the audiences that make up its local context of 
operation. Therefore, provided that it is efficient, an independent central bank works to 
strengthen democracy rather than to undermine it. 
This analysis of the communicative underpinnings of institutional efficiency in 
independent central banking is part of a broader research program on communication in 
central banking. A number of empirical questions are of immediate concern for such a 
program. In particular, the program aims at: 
 
  Identifying the conceptual tools central banks will need to be able to access to 
the ‘vernacular’ languages by which their audiences articulate their experience 
of the monetary process. 
  Identifying the conceptual tools central banks will need to engage in 
language-bridging and language-crafting effort that is required to gain access 
to such vernacular languages. 
  Defining the organizational requirements central banks will have to meet to 
self-consistently, systematically and efficiently manage communicative 
heterogeneity across their audiences. 
  Designing the academic curricula that will produce professional profiles apt to 
meet those organizational requirements. 
  Defining the communicative provisions that monetary constitutions will need 
to contain in order to set the incentive for independent central banks to keep 
managing communicative heterogeneity.   19
  Designing the control procedures by which political institutions will check the 
correct application of the communicative provisions of the monetary 
constitution by independent central banks.  
  Assisting parliamentary commissions in charge of the control of independent 
central banks in the verification of the efficiency credentials of the central 
banks. This paper has explained that the efficiency credentials have also to do 
with the management of communication on the part of the independent central 
bank. I would like to stress that in line with my argument the control of the 
efficiency credentials automatically presupposes the control of the democratic 
credentials. 
 
To address such empirical questions, a research program on communication in 
independent central banking will need to draw from, and systematically connect, at least the 
following bodies of literature: 1) the traditional institutional design literature within the 
political economy of central banking, 2) the literature on robustness in complex systems,
4 
3) the game-theoretical literature on common knowledge and culture,
5  4) the political 
economy literature on expressive rationality,
6  5) the literature in cultural studies and 
sociology of scientific knowledge.
7 
On the methodological front research in this field will need to draw – depending on 
the occasion – from game theory, computational methods in complex systems, 
experimental design, discourse analysis, sociological intervention as well as collaborative 
and participative methodologies. 
                                                 
4 The reading list collected by the Santa Fe Institute Program on Robustness in Natural, Engineering 
and Social Systems is particularly useful in this respect. See in particular, Padgett and Ansell 
(1993); Jen (2001). 
 
5 See Chwe (2001).  
 
6 See Schuessler (2000). 
 
7 See Shils (1975); Alexander and Smith (1993); Alexander (2001); Turner (1974); Sahlins (1981), 
and Galison (1997).  
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A research program on communication in central banking is also bound to take active 
part to the debate over globalization. In one occasion Karl Brunner (1981: 19-20) suggested 
that 
the protective effect of the mystique lowers public accountability of Central Bank 
behavior and offers increased opportunities to exploit the monetary powers for 
political purposes. It also raises the likelihood of mismanagement due to sheer 
ignorance and incompetence. This is particularly serious when we recognize that the 
world’s Central Bank managers form probably a random collection hardly conducive 
to systematic selection of competent and knowledgeable personnel. This does not deny 
the intermittent occurrence of truly outstanding managers of Central Banks, or of 
managers with the wisdom and courage to adjust operations rationally to the uncertain 
knowledge available to us. But these managers remain an exception. 
 
A close study of the phenomenon of communication in independent central banking will 
enable the analyst to distinguish between those situations in which local policy-makers 
deviate from standard economic protocols out of sheer incompetence from those situations 
in which they do so on the ground of their direct access to the type of local knowledge that 
is embodied in the discursive practices of the local communities; that is relevant to central 
bank operations; and that is not directly accessible to external observers. In the latter case 
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